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- House of Representitives
Report on Jonestown--Findings
- May 15, 1979
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A. Jim Jones and People's
Temple
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- Background
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- Whatever Jim Jones ultimately became and
whatever can be said of him now, there is little clear insight into what
motivated him to begin his ministry in Indianapolis in the mid 1950's. Some
contend he was always a committed Socialist who used religion as a vehicle to
further his political beliefs and objectives. Others hold that Jones began as a
genuine believer in Christianity but eventually became a nonbeliever or an
agnostic. His own often-expresssed claim that he was the dual reincarnation of
Christ and Marx reflects the dichotomy. Wherever the truth may lie on his
religious beliefs, at the outset, he was seemingly genuine in his ardent support
for such social causes as the welfare of older people, racial integration, and
rehabilitation of alcoholics and drug addicts. His advocacy of such causes
singled him out, and partially in response to the resistance he encountered in
established churches where he had accepted pastorates, he began his own church,
the People's Temple. By 1965 he had generated enough notoriety and displeasure
in Indiana to cause him to decide to move his activities to California
accompanied by a small band of Indiana followers. One reason he chose Ukiah,
Calif. and its Redwood Valley area was because he had once read that its unique
geographical assets made it one of three locations in the world thought to be
safe from a possible nuclear holocaust.
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- By 1972 he decided to once again relocate
People's Temple to the richer and more active political pastures of San
Francisco and bought an old church building on the edge of the black ghetto
area. A second People's Temple church was established in Los Angeles. In 1974 he
began creating in the jungles of Guyana the agricultural community known as
Jonestown. What finally drove him there together with the majority of his flock
in mid-1977 was the publication of a New West magazine article which exposed
many of his operations, a fact which he saw as part of the alleged mounting
conspiracy against him.
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- Tactics of Jim Jones
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- The mental deviations and distortions and the
psychological tactics which culminated and were most manifest in the holocaust
of Jonestown on November 18 were rooted in Indiana and perfected in California.
Who and what was Jim Jones? We believe it is accurate to say he was charismatic
in some respects; in fact, he was especially adroit in the area of human
psychology.
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- As we have studied him and interviewed those
who knew him well and had come under his influence, we have concluded that he
was first and foremost a master of mind control. Among the tactics he practiced
with engineered precision are the following recognized strategies of
brainwashing:
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- Isolation from all vestiges of former life,
including and especially all sources of information, and substituting himself as
the single source of all knowledge, wisdom, and information;
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- An exacting daily regimen requiring absolute
obedience and humility extracted by deception, intimidation, threats, and
harassment;
- Physical pressure, ranging from deprivation of
food and sleep to the possibility and reality of severe beatings. As a
compliment to the physical pressures, he exerted mental pressures on his
followers which he subsequently relieved in an effort to demonstrate and
establish his omnipotent "powers." For example, he inculcated fictional fears
which he would eventually counterpoint and dispel and thereby establish himself
as a "savior." One of his favorite tactics was to generate and then exploit a
sense of guilt for clinging to life's luxuries, for wanting special privileges,
and for seeking recognition and reward;
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- So-called "struggle meetings" or catharsis
sessions in which recalcitrant members were interrogated, required to confess
their "wrongdoing," and then punished with alternate harshness and leniency.
Interrogation could be gentle and polite, but more often it involved harassment,
humiliation, revilement, and degradation. Vital to this strategy were two of
Jones' favorite techniques. The first involved an exhaustive and detailed record
for each member kept on file cards and generated by his vast intelligence
network. A member would suddenly be confronted by Jones with knowledge of some
action he was unaware had been observed. Jones would stage his "mystic"
awareness of that action and then direct the outcome to his desired end. The
second technique was to establish in each of his followers a mistrust of
everyone else. Consequently, no one dared voice a negative view-even to the
closet family member or friend-for fear of being turned in. Often as not,
trusted aides were directed to test individuals by expressing some comment
critical of Jones or the lifestyle in Jonestown to see if the person would
report the incident. The end result was that no one person could trust another.
As a result everyone feared expressing even the slightest negative comment. The
system was so effective that children turned in their own parents, brothers
informed on sisters, and husbands and wives reported on spouses.
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- Inherent in these principles which Mr. Jones
masterfully and regularly employed was his central strategy of "divide and
conquer" through which he consolidated his power over people.
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- In addition to these tactics, however, Mr.
Jones regularly used other devices and methods to achieve his
ends:
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- Requiring People's Temple members to contribute
as much as 25 percent of their income and sign over to the People's Temple their
properties and other assets;
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- At times dictating marriage between unwilling
partners and at other times not allowing cohabitation between married couples;
- Undermining and breaking a child's ties with
parents. In progressive degrees the child was led to mistrust the parents and
become more and more secretive in his actions and evasive to his parent's
questions;
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- As a symbol of their trust in him, followers
were required to sign statements admitting homosexuality, theft, and other
self-incriminating acts; often as not People's Temple members would also sign
blank pages which could be filled in later. Depending on Jones' need or
objective, such documents were frequently used in attempts to defame defectors;
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- Rumor spreading in an attempt to ruin
reputations or generally implant disinformation, thereby making true facts
difficult if not impossible to establish;
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- Infiltration of groups opposed to People's
Temple and surveilance of suspected People's Temple enemies;
- Intense public relations efforts ranging from
letter-writing campaigns to attempted control of news media in an effort to
influence public opinion with a favorable image of People's Temple; like-wise,
an aggressive program of seeking out political leaders and other influential
members of a community in order to cull their favor and establish identification
with them.
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- In the process of manipulating the control
board of this extraordinary system Jones suffered extreme paranoia. One can
speculate that while it may have been initially staged, his paranoia ultimately
became a self-created Frankenstein that led not only to his fall but the tragic
death of more than 900 others, including Representative Leo J. Ryan. His
paranoia ranged from "dark unnamed forces," to individuals such as Tim Stoen and
other defectors from the People's Temple, to organizations such as the Concerned
Relatives group, and ultimately to the U.S. Government in the form of the CIA
and the FBI--all of which he ultimately believed were out to destroy
him.
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- Further, in establishing this analysis of Jim
Jones it is worth noting that he apparently had several bisexual perversions.
Finally, there is some irony in the fact that although he controlled
considerable wealth (estimated at $12 million) he sought out special privileges
but none of the usual trappings of wealth such as fancy cars or expensive
houses. In short, Mr. Jones was more interested in ideas than in things. He was
not driven by greed for money but for power and control over others. That
control continues to be exerted even after his death on the minds of some of his
followers. It is graphically illustrated by the suicide of Michael Prokes, one
of Jones' closest associates, during a March 13, 1979, press conference in
California in which he defended Jones and cited the achievements of People's
Temple and Jonestown.
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- Motivation of People's Temple
Members
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- The tactics and techniques of Jim Jones
outlined above found fertile ground and were greatly facilitated because of the
background and motivation of those who joined People's Temple. Generalities, of
course, are always difficult if not dangerous. However, on this basis of the
information which has come to us in the course of this investigation one can
draw the following general profile of many who became People's Temple members
and followers of Jim Jones:
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- Some of the young adults were college graduates
out of upper middle-class backgrounds which provided privilege and even luxury.
Their parents were often college-educated professionals or executives.
Frequently, their families were active in demonstrations against the Vietnam
war, campaigns for racial equality, and other social cuases. In some cases, the
young People's Temple member had been alienated by the "emptiness" of his
family's wealth.
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- A larger number, especially young blacks, had
their roots in the other end of the American social and economic spectrum. The
products of poor ghetto neighborhoods and limited education, some had been drug
addicts, prostitutes, and street hustlers.
- An even greater percentage were elderly, again
perdominately black, who had come out of the San Francisco ghetto. They found in
Jim Jones an abiding and protective concern. Despite the harshness of life in
Jonestown, they regarded it as preferable to the poor housing they had left
behind. They also found a warm sense of family and acceptance within the
People's Temple community that they did not have before joining.
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- A goodly number of middle-class blacks and
whites came out of strong fundamentalist religious family backgrounds and were
attracted by what they saw as the evangelical nature of People's Temple.
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- By contrast, many of the younger people had
little if any religious motivation in joining People's Temple. Rather, they
tended to be compelled by humanitarian interests. Altruistic and idealistic,
they were impressed by Jones' involvement in social causes and what they saw as
the "political sophistication" of People's Temple. To the extent that a
religious motivation was involved, it was seen chiefly in terms of Jones'
seeming concrete application of Judeo-Christian principles. Over time, the
dimension of their motivation was not only nonsectarian but eventually became
embodied in the Socialist-Marxist-agnostic philosophy which Jones espoused.
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- People's Temple as a "Church"
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- Out of the findings outlined above regarding
Jim Jones and members of his People's Temple, emerges one additional finding. It
relates to the question of whether or not People's Temple was a "church" in the
generally accepted sense of that word. Again, on the basis of testimony and
compelling evidence collected in the course of this investigation we offer the
following conclusion on that question:
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- Although People's Temple may have been a bona
fide church in its Indiana and early California origins, it progressively lost
that characterization in almost every respect. Rather, by 1972 and following in
progressive degrees, it evolved into what could be described as a sociopolitical
movement. Under the direction and inspiration of it founder and director and the
Marxist-Leninist-Communist philosophy he embraced, People's Temple was in the
end a Socialist structure devoted to socialism. Despite that fact, People's
Temple continued to enjoy the tax-exempt status it received in 1962 under
Internal Revenue Service rules and regulations. The issue of People's Temple's
status as a "church" is also significant in connection with First Amendment
protections it sought and received. Obviously, the latter issue is a difficult
and complex matter beyond the purview of this committee and its
investigation.
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- Also outside the parameters of this committee's
inquiry is whether in fact People's Temple was a "cult." Once again, recognizing
that the problem is complex and laced with emotions and strong connotative
overtones, the committee's investigation went only to the extent of seeking the
opinions of respected legal scholars.
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- B. Conspiracy Against Jim Jones and People's
Temple?
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- Was there a conspiracy against Jim Jones
perpetrated by the U.S. Government or some other organization? That was one of
the questions on which the Staff Investigative Group attempted to obtain
evidence during the course of this inquiry. On the basis of the information
received, the following findings are offered:
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- Jones' idea that there were elements opposed to
his views and objectives dates back to his early days in Indiana. In fact, it
was the adverse reaction he encountered relative to his racial integration and
other policies that led him to establish his own church, the People's Temple
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- When the People's Temple relocated in Ukiah,
Calif. in 1965 Jones' complaints of opposition increased. They ranged in
progressive degree from alleged vandalism against People's Temple property,
poisoning of his pets, and various threats against Jones, to a shooting attack
on Jones' life (from which he "miraculously" recovered by his own power). No
substantiation was ever found on any of these complaints reported to and
investigated by Ukiah police.
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- The mood of Jones' allegations of anti-People's
Temple conspiracy grew darker when the group moved to San Francisco in 1972. At
that time its chief target was the media as well as unspecified "forces."
Reported attempts to dissuade Jones from the notion were apparently
unsuccessful.
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- Jones' idea of a U.S. Government plot against
him, embodied mainly in the CIA and FBI, took full bloom after he and the vast
bulk of People's Temple members moved to Guyana in 1977. Opposition of the
Concerned Relatives group was eventually attributed to CIA backing as were
periodic "alerts" he called to protect the People's Temple Jonestown community
from mercenaries in the jungle around Jonestown.
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- Jones' two lawyers offer contradictory opinions
on the question of a possible conspiracy against People's Temple and Jones. For
example, Mark Lane told the committee's investigators: "***there is no doubt in
my mind that various people sought to destroy Jonestown and that people in
various government agencies manipulated Jones. Jones, himself, saw the efforts
to manipulate him into an overreaction but somehow he was unable to control his
own responses ***. I believe that a responsible investigation by the Congress
would seek to determine why various elements within the United States Government
including those in the State Department withheld from Congressman Ryhan and the
rest of us who accompanied him to Jonestown the fact that they knew the place
was an armed camp and that Jones was capable of killing the Congressman and many
others." On the other hand, Charles Garry said: "***I want to unequivocally tell
you in the year and a half since July 1977, with the years of experience I have
had with governmental conspiracy and government wrongdoing, particularly the
FBI, I found no evidence to support any of the charges that were made by
People's Temple. I found no evidence to support any of that."
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- Granting the strong likelihood of Jones'
paranoia, compounded by his manipulative abilities, Jones staged and exploited
the idea of a conspiracy as a means of generating fear in his adherents and
thereby gaining further control over them. The tactic also served to keep any
opponents on the defensive and even had the apparent effect of sensitizing the
U.S. Embassy in Guyana.
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- No conclusive evidence is available to indicate
that the CIA was acquiring information on Mr. Jones or People's Temple. In this
same connection it should be noted that under Executive Orders 11905 of February
18, 1976 and 12036 of January 24, 1978, which prohibit intelligence gathering on
U.S. citizens, the CIA was legally proscribed from engaging in any activities
vis-a-vis People's Temple.
- The Department of Justice, on the other hand,
has indicated to the Staff Investigative Group that the FBI did look into an
allegation from a constituent of Senator S.I. Hayakawa that "Jim Jones was
coaxing individuals into traveling to Georgetown, Guyana, where they were being
held against their will for unknown reasons." The FBI interviewed the
constituent, but found that "relatives of the constituent had traveled to Guyana
voluntarily, and no evidence of forced confinement was developed." The
investigation was thereupon terminated "because no violation of the Federal
kidnaping statute had occurred."
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- The Staff Investigative Group was also informed
by the Criminal Division of the Justice Department that it received a "citizen
complaint" in December 1977, claiming "that a relative was being held in bondage
in Georgetown, Guyana by Pastor Jim Jones." The facts spelled out in the
complaint indicated no criminal violations within the Justice Department's
jurisdiction. Accordingly Justice's information on the complaint was sent to the
State Department.
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- C. Opponents and Media Intimidated; Public Officials
Used
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- As part of Jones' constant and pervasive effort
to control people and events, the evidence obtained by the Staff Investigative
Group established that he persistently intimidated and harassed those who left
People's Temple and anyone else, especially the media, who he felt were opposed
to his interests. This clear pattern of intimidation and harassment was
reinforced and compounded into success by the widely held belief by People's
Temple defectors and opponents, that government officials were friendly toward
People's Temple or had in some way been compromised. Consequently, attempts at
early efforts to alert the public to the nature of People's Temple's activities
were largely ignored and/or rejected.
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- Typical of some of Jones' tactics to intimidate
and harass People's Temple defectors who were actively opposed to him were the
following:
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- Undermining of their credibility as witnesses
by spreading falsehoods and releasing the so-called "confession" they had signed
while members of People's Temple;
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- Fear campaigns generated through break-ins,
late night phone calls, and unsigned letters threatening beatings and even
death. One such break-in carried out against a couple who had left People's
Temple was done with the help of their daughter who remained in the
organization.
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- As a result of such tactics People's Temple
defectors were frequently frozen in fear and severely hampered in their efforts
to counteract Jones. The problem is illustrated in the following example which
points up the desperate lengths to which opponents of People's Temple were
driven as well as the degree to which officials in San Francisco appear to have
been involved. Afraid to contact any public officials for fear that they were
tied-in or friendly to Jones, one individual went to the length of writing
consumer advocate Ralph Nader because he could not think of anyone else he could
trust. The letter to Nader outlined many of the allegations against People's
Temple which were later proven true. It also indicated that the letter writer
feared for his life. it closed as follows:
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- If you want to help us, please write in the
personal column of the Chronicle to "Angelo" and sign it Ralph and then we will
respond and talk to you.
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- Rather than do that, Nader sent the letter to
the District Attorney's Office in San Francisco. By some means, the letter
filtered back to People's Temple and the writer soon thereafter received a
threatening phone call that said "We know all about your letter to
Angelo."
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- In another instance People's Temple defectors
hired a private detective to surreptitiously observe their meeting with Jones'
representatives in a public subway station. Their objective was to have an
eyewitness in the event of violence.
- With respect to Jim Jones' and People's Temple
efforts to stifle the San Francisco media some of the following methods were
employed:
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- The threat of law suits. In almost all
instances in which this tactic was used it was based on the People's Temple
possession of copies of stories in draft form prior to publication obtained
through break-ins or provided to People's Temple by infiltrators within the
media's office.
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- Threatening phone calls to reporters and their
families, accepted by one as serious enough to warrant relocating children,
moving into hotels, and obtaining guns for self-protection.
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- Extensive letter-writing campaigns intended to
dissuade publishers and editors from printing stories being prepared by
aggressive reporters. The soft-sell nature of this tactic was aimed at creating
diversionary arguments contending that the story in question would reflect badly
on San Francisco or prevent People's Temple "from continuing its good work with
the 'disaffected and disaffiliated' in society." One such campaign produced
letters supportive of People's Temple from San Francisco Mayor George Moscone,
Lieutenant Governor Mervyn Dymally, the head of the San Francisco school system,
and members of the California State Assembly. It would appear that such
campaigns were particularly effective with the San Francisco Chronicle and the
National Enquirer.
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- Encouraging San Francisco merchants and
businesses to remove their advertising from "offending" publications. The chief
target of such an effort was the New West magazine immediately prior to its
publication in August 1977, of an article critical of Jones. The editor of the
magazine persisted and the article is generally credited with breaking Jones'
stronghold on San Francisco and led him to go to Guyana immediately before it
appeared.
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- The picketing of newspaper offices which had
run stories on Jones regarded as anti-People's Temple. One such effort, combined
with the threat of a law suit, led to the cancellation in 1972 by the San
Francisco Examiner of an eight-part series of articles, only half of which had
already appeared. The end result was to make most editors and publishers highly
sensitive and cautious regarding any critical stories involving Jones and the
People's Temple.
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- Finally, as to the question of whether or not
certain officials had in fact been compromised by Jones, the Staff Investigative
Group believes the evidence is mixed. What is indisputably clear and solidly
based on evidence is that many such officials were perceived of by Jones'
opponents as extremely friendly to or enthusiastically supportive of Jones,
thereby precluding them or their offices from pursuing actions against Jones in
an impartial manner. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that Jones had
endowed himself with the cloak of official legitimacy through his appointment by
Mayor Moscone as director of the San Francisco Housing Authority. In addition
political figures in San Francisco appear to have been enticed by Jones' ability
to turn out hundreds of his followers to attend rallys, conduct mailings, man
phone-banks, and otherwise provide support to political election campaigns,
including some direct contributions.
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- Similarly, the media were not immune from
Jones' wiles and attemped flatteries. For example, Jones made contributions of
various sums totaling $4,400 to the San Francisco Examiner, the San Francisco
Chronicle, and 10 other newspapers to be used as they saw fit in the "defense of
a free press," Although the Examiner returned the money to the People's Temple,
the management of the Chronicle sent the check to Sigma Delta Chi, the national
journalism society, which in turn rejected suggestions that it be returned to
People's Temple.
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- D. Awareness of Danger; Predicting the Degree of
Violence
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- One area on which this inquiry concentrated
under Chairman Zablocki's mandate dealt with the questions of whether (a)
Representative Ryan had been adequately advised of the potential for danger, and
(b) how accurately anyone could have predicted the degree of violence employed.
On the basis of evidence gathered we have reached conclusions on both
counts:
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- Representative Ryan was advised on more than
one occasion of the possibility of violence inherent in his trip to Jonestown.
However, he tended to discount such warnings with the thought that his office as
a Congressman would protect him. Moreover, he was apparently willing to face
whatever danger might be present, citing as a reason his own previous
investigative experiences and his determination not to be influenced by fear.
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- The warnings Mr. Ryan did receive regarding the
prospect for violence came chiefly from his own staff and the Concerned
Relatives group. When the issue was raised in the State Department briefings
prior to the trip, Mr. Ryan did not challenge State's assessment that potential
danger was "unlikely." In fact, State's briefings for the Ryan Codel dwelled
almost exclusively on the legal problems relative to the trip as well as the
logistical difficulties involved in reaching the remote and isolated jungle
compound.
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- No one interviewed by the Staff Investigative
Group ever anticipated the degree of violence acutally encountered. Many
expected that there might be adversarial encounters, arguments, or shouting; the
worst anticipated was that someone might "get punched in the mouth."
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- From a variety of sources, Representative Ryan
and some representatives of the media were cautioned that they were regarded as
adversaries of People's Temple and Jones. They were further informed that Jones
was paranoid. It is appropriate to note here that Mr. Ryan apparently did not
advise anyone in the State Department or the U.S. Embassy in Guyana that one of
the purposes of his trip was to help possible defectors leave Jonestown with him
on November 18.
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- Some members of Mr. Ryan's staff as well as the
media group had gut feelings on the possibility for violence. They ranged from
advising Mr. Ryan that Jones had a "capacity" for violence, to a general concern
based on allegations of guns in Jonestown, and finally, to the thought that a
bomb might be placed on the plane on which the entire party flew to Guyana. At
the most extreme end of such intuitive hunches and feelings was Miss Jackie
Speier's premotion of fear that led her to write her own will.
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- To the extent that violence was considered a
possibility by the Ryan Codel, there is evidence to suggest that Mr. Ryan may
have looked on the accompanying media group as a "shield"; conversely, to the
extent there was any apprehension in their ranks, the media regarded Mr. Ryan's
status as a Congressman as their best protection. For other members of the
media, the principal potential danger considered was the jungle against which
they protected themselves by taking special supplies.
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- E. U.S. Customs Service
Investigation
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- One key element relating to the question of
whether the Ryan Codel had adequate awareness of the potential for danger as
well as the degree of violence which ultimately ensued involves a 1977 U.S.
Customs Service investigation of reported illegal gun shipments and other
contraband to Jonestown. In the course of this inquiry, therefore, the Staff
Investigative Group obtained evidence which warrants the following findings on
the subject:
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- Working on allegations interspersed amid many
"bizarre" tales about People's Temple, the investigation was begun in February
1977. One of the allegations contended that more than 170 weapons once stored in
Ukiah had been transferred to People's Temple San Francisco headquarters and
then possibly on to Jonestown.
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- The investigation was compromised 1 month after
it began, not through any inadvertence on the part of the Customs Service, but
when an individual conveyed some information on the matter to Dennis Banks, head
of the American Indian Movement, in an effort to dissuade Banks from any further
contact with Jones. That conversation was apparently taped and word was passed
to Jones. Complete details of the investigation's report were further
compromised when a copy of the report was sent to Interpol. From Interpol it was
by normal procedure, shared with the Guyanese police. According to information
provided us, Guyanese Police Commissioner C. A. "Skip" Roberts reportedly showed
a copy to either Paula Adams or Carolyn Layton, two of Mr. Jones' trusted aides,
one of whom passed the information to Mr. Jones.
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- Although the Customs Service investigation was
not diluted or diminished in any way, it is clear that it was carried out in an
unusually sensitive mode because of what was perceived to be Jim Jones'
considerable political influence in San Francisco. Surveillance relating to the
investigation was virtually impossible to carry out because of the tight
security screen Jones placed around the Geary Street headquarters of People's
Temple in San Francisco.
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- The investigation was concluded in
August-September 1977 after a shipment of crates destined for Jonestown was
opened and inspected by the Customs Service in Miami in August 1977. Shortly
thereafter a report on the investigation was filed with negative results.
Nonetheless, investigators apparently felt enough residual suspicion to send
copies of the report to Interpol and the U.S. Department of State "because (the)
investigation disclosed allegations that Jones intends to establish a political
power base in Guyana, and that he may currently have several hundred firearms in
that country***."
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- The copy of the Customs Service report was
received in the State Department's Office of Munitions Control on September 1,
1997 and on September 6, 1977 a copy was forwarded to the Department's Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs. although standard routing procedures provided that a
copy should have been sent to the U.S. Embassy in Guyana there is no indication
a copy ever was sent. In addition, only the Guyana desk officer saw the report:
none of the more than 26 State Department officials we interviewed saw the
report until after November 18, 1978, although one professed "awareness" of it
earlier.
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- F. Conspiracy To Kill Representative
Ryan?
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- Relative to the likelihood of a People's
Temple-Jim Jones conspiracy to kill Representative Ryan, the Staff Investigative
Group has reached the following conclusions based on evidence available to
us:
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- The possibility of any prior conspiracy tends
to be diminished by the fact that Gordon Lindsay, a reporter whom Mr. Jones
regarded as an arch enemy of People's Temple, was not allowed to enter Jonestown
with the Ryan party.
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- Still not to be discounted entirely, however,
is the possible existence of a contingency conspiracy. In this connection, there
are reports of an "understanding' in Jonestown that if efforts to delude Ryan as
to the true conditions at Jonestown failed he would have to be killed,
supposedly by arranging for his plane to crash in the jungle after leaving
Jonestown. While circumstantial evidence is available on this theory we have not
found any hard evidence.
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- Providing some moderate credence to the idea of
a contingency conspiracy is the fact that the Jonestown mass suicide/murder
ritual started before the Port Kaituma assailants returned to confirm the
shootings of Representative Ryan and others.
- Also lending some substance to the contingency
conspiracy theory are unconfirmed reports that a large shipment of cyanide, used
in the mass suicide/murder, arrived in Jonestown 2 days before Ryan's visit.
Also related is the reported statement of a Jonestown survivor that several days
before Mr. Ryan arrived in Jonestown he heard Jones say that the Congressman's
plane "might fall from the sky."
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- In an effort to obtain detailed information on
Mr. Ryan's upcoming trip, Jones placed a phony defector within the ranks of the
Concerned Relatives group in San Francisco 1 month before the Codel's departure
for Guyana. The "defector" was seen back in Jonestown when the Ryan party
arrived. The late awareness that the defector was false produced a heightened
sense of danger in the minds of some making the trip.
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- G. The Privacy Act and the Freedom of
Information Act
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- Throughout this investigation there were
repeated references made as to the pervasive role of the Privacy Act and, to a
lesser degree, the Fredom of Information Act in the tragedy at Jonestown. The
Staff Investigative Group made a careful and thorough review of the issue which
resulted in the following findings:
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- The Privacy Act figured prominently in several
important aspects of the State Department's and U.S. Embassy's briefings and
relations with the Ryan Codel and their handling of all matters relating to
People's Temple.
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- Officials within both the State Department and
the Embassy clearly tended to confuse the Privacy Act with the Freedom of
Information Act, thereby inhibiting the comprehensiveness of written reports and
exchanges of information.1 One
key Embassy official, for instance, was operating under the mistaken assumption
that People's Temple was seeking cables reporting on consular visits to
Jonestown under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
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- Representative Ryan's legal advisers contended
that the State Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act was unreasonably
narrow and restrictive and further felt that fact had ramifications on what the
Codel wished to accomplish. Those differences, which began in Washington and
continued in Guyana, resulted in somewhat strained relations between the State
Department and the Codel.
- The State Department's interpretation of the
Privacy Act led them to deny Ryan access to certain information and documents
relative to People's Temple. That problem could have been avoided or at least
alleviated if Mr. Ryan had followed the Department's advice to obtain a letter
from the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs authorizing him such
access under an exemption clause in the act. That exemption provision permits
disclousure to any committee of Congress "to the extent of matter within its
jurisdiction." Reflecting the State Department's lack of knowledge of the law
and its application, it is pertinent to note that on February 28, 1979, the
State Department was unaware of the exemption provision in denying to Chairman
Zablocki requested information germane to the investigation.
-
- Prior to the Codel's departure, the U.S.
Embassy in Guyana reflected its own acute sensitivity regarding the Privacy Act
by urging that Mr. Ryan be fully informed of the act's limitations. That
sensitivity was reinforced by the Embassy's request that a Department legal
expert accompany the Codel, a request denied by State because of travel freeze
restrictions and the heavy press of other work.
- Among the Embassy officials interviewed there
is almost unanimous agreement that the Privacy Act is complex, difficult to
understand, and confusing. Accordingly, they believe that regular guidance is
required to guarantee proper implementation.
- Initial State Department guidance on the
Privacy Act provided to the U.S. Embassy in Guyana was so highly techhnical and
legalistic that it had little if any practical value, a problem compounded by
subsequent communications. It was not until November 18, 1977, almost 3 years
after the Privacy Act became law, that the Embassy was provided with what could
be regarded as practical guidance. However, even that communication contained
the following prefatory comment: "Due to its rapid passage by Congress in
December 1974 without hearings, less than the usual legislative history exists
to guide executive departments in interpreting history exists to guide executive
departments in interpreting it.***." Available at that time was a 1,500-page
volume, "Legislative History of the Privcacy Act of 1974," which incorporated
committee reports, markup sessions, excerpts from floor debate and other
pertinent source materials.
-
- In day-to-day operations and application, the
Privacy Act impacts more on the State Department's consular section than on its
diplomatic officers.
-
- Given the confusion surrounding the Privacy Act
and the lack of practical and understandable guidance, it appears that Embassy
consular officers in Guyana found the act difficult to implement properly. In
contrast, most of their Washington counterparts, in both political and consular
sections of the Department, did not perceive the Embassy's problems and felt the
guidance provided was adequate.
-
- Also contributing to those official's ability
to effectively implement the Privacy Act vis-a-vis the People's Temple was the
understanding they held that as a religious organization People's Temple merited
added protection under the act. Disregarding for now the question of whether or
not People's Temple was a religion, few of the officials knew that the act's
prohibition on maintaining records describing the exercise of the first
amendment rights also provides and exception for matters pertinent to law
enforcement activities. Further, there appeared to be little general awareness
among State Department Personnel of other exemptions provided in both the
Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act from mandatory agency disclosure
of information.
-
- The legal recourse Jones and People's Temple
had under the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act to obtain Embassy
cables had the chilling effect on Embassy personnel of making their
communications to the State Department on People's Temple less candid than they
might have otherwise been. That effect was reinforced when the Embassy learned
on December 2, 1977, that People's Temple had in fact filed a total of 26
actions under the Privacy Act, for documents relating to specified People's
Temple members. As a byproduct of these restraints it is reasonable to conclude
that the Embassy's inhibitions to more candidly and accurately report their
impressions of the true situation in Jonestown ultimately influenced the State
Department's ability to more effectively brief the Ryan Codel. Also not to be
discounted is the strong possibility that, knowing the law and the effect it
could produce, Jones used the legal claim actions as a tactic in order to
achieve the very effect it did.
-
- Overall, many State Department officials
appeared to be highly aware of the civil and/or criminal penalty provisions of
both acts. That fact reinforced their perceived image of both acts as
threatening and troublesome in that failure to comply could present them with
serious personal legal problems. In turn, that thought made them doubly cautious
in their dealings with People's Temple.
-
- H. Role and Performance of the U.S. Department
of State
-
- The role and performance of the State
Department in this matter was the central issue earmarked for investigation in
Chairman Zablocki's mandate to the Staff Investigative Group. The points of
reference surrounding that issue span 4 years and are complex and many. Given
this reality, a major part of the investigation was devoted to this aspect of
the issue. The following conclusions and findings based on evidence gathered
are:
-
- The U.S. Embassy in Guyana did not demonstrate
adequate initiative, sensitive reaction to, and apprecitation of progressively
mounting indications of highly irregular and illegal activities in Jonestown.
The Embassy's one attempt to confront the situation and affect a solution did
not occur until June 1978. Essentially embodying what could at best be described
as the Embassy's heightened suspicion of problems with People's Temple, the
effort was made in the form of a cable to the State Department requesting
permission to approach the Guyanese Government and "request that the government
exercise normal adminintrative jurisdiction over the community, particularly to
insure that all of its residents are informed and understand that they are
subject to the laws and authority of the Government of Guyana***." The State
Department, failing to detect any linkage between Log 126 and the then recent
defection of Temple member Debbie Blakey and other incidents, rejected the
request in a terse cable because such an overture "could be construed by some as
U.S. Government interference." (Debbie Blakey defected from the People's Temple
in Georgetown, Guyana on May 12, 1978, with the assistance of U.S. Embassy
officers Richard McCoy and Daniel Weber. Prior to her departure to the United
States, she submitted a written statement to the Embassy warning, among other
things, of the possibility of a mass suicide in Jonestown.)
-
- The Department's negative response to Log 126
had the net effect of reinforcing the Embassy's already cautious attitude in all
dealings with the People's Temple. Despite the fact that an affirmative response
was anticipated, the Embassy surprisingly made no effort to challenge the
Department's negative decision. Equally surprising was the Department's failure
to contact the Ambassador and determine what specifically triggered his request.
Testimony from Department witnesses indicates that the lack of specificity in
Log 126 was the primary reason for the negative response in Log 130. Such
specificity (e.g., Blakey defection) was deliberately avoided, according to the
Ambassador, because of Privacy Act considerations. The upshot of this exchange
was a lamentable breakdown in communication with neither side making any further
efforts to discuss or follow up on the matter.
-
- Mitigating factors were present wihich require
acknowledgment. For example, it is understandable that the Embassy did not have
an investigative or judicial function. It also felt compelled to abide by U.S.
laws as well as strict State Department rules and regulations while
simultaneously respecting the hospitality of Guyana. Embassy personnel were also
faced with the challenge of trying to remain objective in the face of two
opposing groups of Americans often presenting contradictory stories; a factor
reinforced by numerous letters, articles, and documents reflecting equally pro
and con dimensions on Jones and the People's Temple. Out of that balance the
Embassy concluded only that People's Temple prior to November 18, 1978, was a
"controversial" or "unusual" group.
-
- Nevertheless, absent in the Embassy's dealings
with People's Temple were the vital elements of common sense and an honest and
healthy skepticism. Despite the acknowledged handicaps under which it worked the
Embassy could have exerted sounder overall judgment and a more aggressive
posture. One important result of such an effort would have been more accurate
and straightforward reporting on the People's Temlple situation which, in turn,
could have given the State Department a stronger and wider base on which to draw
in biefing Representative Ryan and his staff. In this connection, the Privacy
Act and the Freedom of Information Act, each of which was discussed in a
previous section, played important roles.
-
- It is proven beyond doubt that Jones staged a
show for selective visitors to Jonestown which made it difficult to get a
realistic and accurate picture of what was actually happening there. The ability
of the Embassy to break through this facade was severely hampered by several
factors. First, the "Embassy provided in advance to People's Temple, the names
of most but not all of the individuals who were to be interviewed by visiting
consular officers. That practice allowed Jones to rehearse those people on what
to say and how to act. Second, such "staging" practices were greatly facilitated
by the limited time spent in Jonestown by visiting U.S. Embassy officials-an
average of 5-8 hours on four different occasions between August 30, 1977, and
November 7, 1978.
- In conducting normal consular activities in
Jonestown and in other interactions with People's Temple, Embassy officials were
restricted by constitutionally mandated safeguards prohibiting interference with
free exercise of religious beliefs and with legally sanctioned religious
organizations. Recognizing that this issue is not within the direct purview of
the committee's investigation, we nevertheless note (as observed earlier) that
many People's Temple members were originally motivated less by religious
considerations than by a general social idealism. In addition, it is clear that
People's Temple had little specific dimension or few surface trappings which
would have made it a "church."
-
- There was a laxness in State Department
procedures for distributing certain important documents relative to People's
Temple, thereby inhibiting the opportunity for taking appropriate action. Chief
among these was the U.S. Customs Service report on possible gun shipments to
Jonestown. Others include the April 10, 1978, affidavit by Yolanda D.A.
Crawford, a People's Temple defector, describing beatings and abuses in
Jonestown; the affidavit signed in May 1978 by Debbie Blakey, another People's
Temple defector, describing suicide rehearsals and other serious charges; and
finally the New West magazine article of August 1, 1977, which exposed Jones. A
wider awareness of these and similar materials would have significantly enhanced
the State Department's ability to evaluate the situation. As a reflection of the
problem it is interesting to note that a number of State Department officials
interviewed readily volunteered the observation that prior to his trip to Guyana
"Mr. Ryan knew more about People's Temple and Jonestown than we did."
- State Department organization and day-to-day
operations created a distinction between its consular activities and its
diplomatic responsibilities. Inadequate coordination between those two functions
led to a situation in which matters involving People's Temple were regarded
almost exclusively as consular. Despite mounting indications that the People's
Temple issue was spilling over into the United States-Guyana diplomatic area,
the mentality persisted of relegating it to the consular side.
-
- In the area of crisis management following the
tragedy of November 18 the State Department and Embassy performed with
distinction. Particularly praiseworthy in this regard were the brave and
dedicated efforts of Richard Dwyer in aiding and providing leadership under
trying circumstances to survivors of the Port Kaituma shooting. Equally
admirable were the Department's and Embassy's efforts in evacuating the wounded,
providing assistance to others, and keeping Washington officials adequately
informed of developments. Also commendable was the competent and efficient work
of Department of Defense personnel in assisting the wounded and others and
returning them to the United States.
-
- As to allegations that a female member of
People't Temple in Guyana had engaged in a sexual liaison with former U.S.
Consul Richard McCoy and had made tape recordings of their sexual activities in
an attempt to compromise McCoy, it is our firm judgment, based on our findings,
that such allegations are false.The woman in question has in fact testified and
signed an affidavit categorically denying all such charges. She further stated
that, "To the best of my knowledge, no member of People's Temple engaged in any
sexual activity with Richard A. McCoy" and that the People's Temple relationship
with McCoy was one of "mistrust and strained discussion though not openly
hostile." Nor is there any evidence to indicate that any other person affiliated
with the U.S. Embassy in Guyana had at any time been compromised by the People's
Temple.
-
- I. Involvement of the Government of
Guyana
-
- On the issue of People's Temple involvement
with the Government of Guyana, the Staff Investigative Group renders the
following incomplete findings:
-
- There is evidence of a strong working
relationship between the People's Temple and some officials of the Government of
Guyana, especially in the areas of customs and immigration. It is obvious that a
special privileged status allowed People's Temple to bring that special
privileged status allowed People's Temple to bring items into Guyana outside of
the usual customs procedures, often with cursory inspection at best. Many
shipments were inspected perfunctorily or not at all. It is likely that People's
Temple brought large sums of money and guns into Guyana in suitcases and
false-bottom creates as a result of such customs inspections. As a matter of
fact, some of these concerns were expressed by Guyanese officials.
-
- Guyanese immigration procedures were also
compromised to the advantage of People's Temple on several occasions, chiefly in
two key areas. First, People's Temple members were able to facilitate entry of
their own members or inhibit the exit of defectors by having access to customs
areas at Timehri Airport in Georgetown closed to all other citizens. Second,
clearly arbitrary decisions were made to curtail the visas and expedite the exit
of individuals regarded as opponents of People's Temple. Only upon the strenuous
efforts of the U.S. Embassy were some of these decisions ultimately reversed and
then at the last minute.
-
- There are in the investigative record repeated
charges of a sexual liaison between People's Temple member Paula Adams and
Laurence Mann, Guyana's Ambassador to the United States. It has encounters with
Mann. Transcripts of some of those tapes were apparently made for Mr. Jones and
periodically turned over to high officials in the Guyanese Government.
- There is also evidence, incomplete and
inconclusive, that unknown officials of the Guyanese Government may have taken
action to influence the outcome of the Stoen custody case proceedings in the
Guyanese court system.
-
- Testimony from some witnesses suggest that
support extended to the People's Temple by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Development Ptolemy Reid was born of an ideological compatibility with an
endorsement of the Temple's Socialist philosophy. While such support was
exploited in the sense that it had the ultimate effect of furthering People's
Temple objectives, it did not appear to be generated for illegal reasons.
-
- Note-In reference to these findings regarding
the relationship of the Government of Guyana to the People's Temple, the Staff
Investigative Group was precluded from confirming or dispelling various
allegations by the refusal of the Guyanese Government to meet and talk with the
Group, per Chairman Zablocki's requests of March 2 and 16, 1979. Consequently,
to our regret, some of the findings noted above must remain partial and
incomplete. There is no doubt in our mind, however, that our inability to
interview Guyanese Government officials leaves this report with a conspicuous
void.
-
- J. Social Security; Foster
Children
-
- Although this inquiry's scope did not require
investigating allegations that the People's Temple stole or fraudulently used
its members social security benefits, some information regarding these charges
did surface during the course of the probe that is worth noting.
-
- At the time of the tragedy of November 18,
1978, a total of 199 social security annuitants reportedly lived in Jonestown.
Altogether their annuities amounted to approximately $37,000 per month. It is
readily apparent that this income contributed substantially to the maintenance
of the Jonestown operations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is
presently conducting a review of its responsibilities and performances in paying
benefits to Temple members. In this regard, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare has submitted an interim report to the committee. In essence, the
report indicates that to date no wrongdoing on the part of the temple has been
discovered. It does cite, however, four cases that are being investigated
because the beneficiaries' checks were being forwarded to Guyana from the United
States without Social Security Administration's records revealing their correct
addresses. The Social Security Administration review is continuing and upon its
completion the committee is to receive a copy of the final report.
- The interim report indicates, inter alia, that
the Social Security Administration is responsible for administering Section 207
of the Social Security Act (43 U.S.C. 407) which provides, "the right of any
person to any future payment under this title shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity***." Consequently, whenever a social security
annuitant requests that his or her checks be mailed to someone else's address
the Social Security Administration looks into the possibility of assignment.
Such an inquiry was launched after Temple members moved to Guyana and asked that
their monthly payments be mailed in care of the Jonestown settlement's post
office box address.
-
- The U.S.Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana was asked
by the Social Security Administration to query Jonestown residents as to why
they wanted their checks sent to the settlement's post office address and
whether any of the beneficaries had assigned the right to future payments to the
People's Temple.
-
- In response to the Social Security
Administration's request, U.S. Consul Richard McCoy, during January and May 1978
visits to Jonestown, determined that the post office box address was being used
for the convenience of the beneficiaries, that each annuitant interviewed was
receiving and controlling the use of his monthly payment, and that none had
assigned their checks to the Temple. McCoy's successor, Douglas Ellice,
accompanied by Vice Consul Dennis Reece, also checked into social security
matters during a November 7, 1978, visit to Jonestown.
-
- McCoy did find Jonestown social security
beneficiaries who were heavily influenced to turn over their monthly benefits to
the Temple. Nevertheless, in his estimation, these individuals volutarily gave
their money to the Temple. In addition, he reported that all of the
beneficiaries he saw in Jonestown appeared to be adequately housed, fed, and in
relatively good health. Given these findings, the Social Security Administration
decided to continue the procedure of mailing the monthly checks to the Jonestown
post office box address.
-
- Section 1611 (f) of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 1811 (f)) stipulates that:
- ***no individual shall be considered an
eligible individual for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, for any
month during all of which such individual is outside the United
States***
- According to the Social Security Administration
interim report:
-
- ***as soon as it was learned that members of
the People's Temple were moving to Guyana, the Social Security Administration
district office in San Francisco, working with postal officials and officials of
the People's Temple, went to extraordinary lengths to ensure Social Security
Administration was notified when a member who was entitled to social security
benefits moved abroad. This action proved very effective. When members who had
been entitled to SSI benefits left the United States, action was taken to stop
the SSI payments.
-
- To date, the Social Security Administration has
discovered only one instance of a Temple beneficiary going to Guyana without
notifying Social Security Administration authorities. This individual's checks
were received and cashed by her husband who continued to live in the United
States. The Social Security Administration has found nothing to indicate that
the failure to report the wife's move to Guyana involved People's Temple
officials.
- The Staff Investigative Group has been informed
by the Social Security Administration that its ongoing review of payments to
Temple members is focusing on the following:
-
- (a) Did any of the Retirement Survivors
Disability Insurance (RSDI) beneficiaries living in Jonestown die there before
November 18, 1978, without the knowledge of the Social Security
Administration?
- (b) Were any SSI payments made to a beneficiary
for months after the month that individual left the United states? (As mentioned
earlier, such payments are illegal.)
-
- Some 656 social security checks were found
uncashed and undeposited in Jonestown after the November 18 tragedy. According
to one State Department official, the vast majority of the approximately
$160,000 in checks recovered in Jonestown were August, September, and October
1978 social security checks.
-
- The Social Security Administration claims it
will be several months before the process of identifying the remains of the
Jonestown dead is finished. At last report, 173 social security beneficiaries
have been positively identified as dead. Eight others are known to have
survived. The balance of 18 are still unaccounted for but the presumption is
that they are among the unidentified deceased.
-
- Possibly as many as 150 foster children have
been alleged to have died in Jonestown during the mass suicide/murder ritual of
last November. Senator Alan Cranston's Subcommittee on Child and Human
Development is conducting an investigation of these charges with the assistance
of the GAO. Preliminary indications are that 12 California foster children may
be identified as having died. Greatly complicating the identification process is
the fact that neither dental nor fingerprint records exist on most of the
children. At this writing, it is hoped that the GAO investigators may be able to
provide at least a preliminary report of their findings to Senator Cranston's
subcommittee by the end of May 1979 for a hearing that will be held in Los
Angeles.
-
- The Staff Investigative Group was informed by
State Department witnesses that the U.S. Embassy in Guyana was never asked by
California welfare officials to check on the welfare and whereabouts of
California foster children reportedly living in Jonestown. The U.S. Embassy,
however, was aware that some foster children may have been living there and
asked the Department of State to determine whether it was legal for such wards
of the State to leave the United States. One Department witness stated that he
queried appropriate California authorities and was told that court permission
was required to take them out of the State. This same official also discerned
some reluctance on the part of these authorities to talk about the
subject.
-
- K. Future Status of People's
Temple
-
- Although it was beyond the purview of the
inquiry as mandated by Chairman Zablocki, the Staff Investigative Group obtained
evidence and impressions relative to the possible future status of People's
Temple and some related matters which the Group believes are useful to establish
for this record.
-
- Accordingly, it is our judgment at this time
that the possibility of People's Temple being reconstituted cannot be
discounted. This belief is based in large measure on the distinction seemingly
held by surviving People's Temple members between Jim Jones as an individual and
what People's Temple represented as an organization.Thus, while some remaining
People's Temple members express varying degrees of regret, dismay, and
disapproval over what Jim Jones did, they still seem to embrace the principles
and objectives which they believer People's Temple sought to achieve. There is
also some evidence to suggest that a power struggle may be underway within the
ranks of surviving People's Temple sought to achieve. There is also some
evidence to suggest that a power struggle may be underway within the ranks of
surviving People's Temple members in an attempt to establish a new leader. Only
time will determine whether in fact such a development may take
place.
-
- While the existence of a reported "hit squad"
whose purported purpose is to eliminate Jones' staunchest opponents cannot be
concretely documented it should not totally discounted. this group has been
described as including some of Jones' most zealous adherents. There is evidence
to suggest Jones and some of his key lieutenants discussed and had
"understandings" to eliminate various individuals, including national political
leaders. Time may diminish the possible threat of this factor in any and all
future activities and investigations aimed at People's Temple.
- 1. Much of the confusion over these two acts
results from the sometimes conflicting principal purposes for which each was
enacted. The Privacy Act guarantees the privacy of public records maintained on
an individual and limits access, except for the concerned party, to these
records by other individuals and government agencies. The Freedom of Information
Act guarantees an individual access to records pertinent to the operations of
the Federal Government but safeguards the privacy of individuals cited in those
records.
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