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House of Representitives Report on
Jonestown--Findings
- May 15,
1979
- On the basis
of the factual evidence obtained by the Staff Investigative Group, we
render the following findings. In doing so we recognize that we are
the beneficiaries of retrospect on the events which preceded November
18, 1978. In this respect, we have striven to utilize these advantages
without falling victim to the pitfalls accompanying them. We have
sought to be objective and balanced but not frozen from judgement. In
attempting to be fair and understanding, we have not been
timid.
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- Table of
Contents
- A. Jim Jones and
People's Temple
- B. Conspiracy Against
Jim Jones and People's Temple?
- C. Opponents and Media
Intimidated; Public Officials Used
- D. Awareness of
Danger; Predicting the Degree of Violence
- E. U.S. Customs
Service Investigation
- F. Conspiracy To Kill
Representative Ryan?
- G. The Privacy Act and
the Freedom of Information Act
- H. Role and
Performance of the U.S. Department of State
- I. Involvement of the
Government of Guyana
- J. Social Security;
Foster Children
- K. Future Status of
People's Temple
-
-
- A. Jim Jones
and People's Temple
-
- Background
-
- Whatever Jim
Jones ultimately became and whatever can be said of him now, there is
little clear insight into what motivated him to begin his ministry in
Indianapolis in the mid 1950's. Some contend he was always a committed
Socialist who used religion as a vehicle to further his political
beliefs and objectives. Others hold that Jones began as a genuine
believer in Christianity but eventually became a nonbeliever or an
agnostic. His own often-expresssed claim that he was the dual
reincarnation of Christ and Marx reflects the dichotomy. Wherever the
truth may lie on his religious beliefs, at the outset, he was
seemingly genuine in his ardent support for such social causes as the
welfare of older people, racial integration, and rehabilitation of
alcoholics and drug addicts. His advocacy of such causes singled him
out, and partially in response to the resistance he encountered in
established churches where he had accepted pastorates, he began his
own church, the People's Temple. By 1965 he had generated enough
notoriety and displeasure in Indiana to cause him to decide to move
his activities to California accompanied by a small band of Indiana
followers. One reason he chose Ukiah, Calif. and its Redwood Valley
area was because he had once read that its unique geographical assets
made it one of three locations in the world thought to be safe from a
possible nuclear holocaust.
-
- By 1972 he
decided to once again relocate People's Temple to the richer and more
active political pastures of San Francisco and bought an old church
building on the edge of the black ghetto area. A second People's
Temple church was established in Los Angeles. In 1974 he began
creating in the jungles of Guyana the agricultural community known as
Jonestown. What finally drove him there together with the majority of
his flock in mid-1977 was the publication of a New West magazine
article which exposed many of his operations, a fact which he saw as
part of the alleged mounting conspiracy against him.
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- Tactics of
Jim Jones
-
- The mental
deviations and distortions and the psychological tactics which
culminated and were most manifest in the holocaust of Jonestown on
November 18 were rooted in Indiana and perfected in California. Who
and what was Jim Jones? We believe it is accurate to say he was
charismatic in some respects; in fact, he was especially adroit in the
area of human psychology.
-
- As we have
studied him and interviewed those who knew him well and had come under
his influence, we have concluded that he was first and foremost a
master of mind control. Among the tactics he practiced with engineered
precision are the following recognized strategies of
brainwashing:
-
- Isolation
from all vestiges of former life, including and especially all
sources of information, and substituting himself as the single
source of all knowledge, wisdom, and information;
-
- An
exacting daily regimen requiring absolute obedience and humility
extracted by deception, intimidation, threats, and harassment;
- Physical
pressure, ranging from deprivation of food and sleep to the
possibility and reality of severe beatings. As a compliment to the
physical pressures, he exerted mental pressures on his followers
which he subsequently relieved in an effort to demonstrate and
establish his omnipotent "powers." For example, he inculcated
fictional fears which he would eventually counterpoint and dispel
and thereby establish himself as a "savior." One of his favorite
tactics was to generate and then exploit a sense of guilt for
clinging to life's luxuries, for wanting special privileges, and for
seeking recognition and reward;
-
- So-called
"struggle meetings" or catharsis sessions in which recalcitrant
members were interrogated, required to confess their "wrongdoing,"
and then punished with alternate harshness and leniency.
Interrogation could be gentle and polite, but more often it involved
harassment, humiliation, revilement, and degradation. Vital to this
strategy were two of Jones' favorite techniques. The first involved
an exhaustive and detailed record for each member kept on file cards
and generated by his vast intelligence network. A member would
suddenly be confronted by Jones with knowledge of some action he was
unaware had been observed. Jones would stage his "mystic" awareness
of that action and then direct the outcome to his desired end. The
second technique was to establish in each of his followers a
mistrust of everyone else. Consequently, no one dared voice a
negative view-even to the closet family member or friend-for fear of
being turned in. Often as not, trusted aides were directed to test
individuals by expressing some comment critical of Jones or the
lifestyle in Jonestown to see if the person would report the
incident. The end result was that no one person could trust another.
As a result everyone feared expressing even the slightest negative
comment. The system was so effective that children turned in their
own parents, brothers informed on sisters, and husbands and wives
reported on spouses.
- Inherent in
these principles which Mr. Jones masterfully and regularly employed
was his central strategy of "divide and conquer" through which he
consolidated his power over people.
-
- In addition
to these tactics, however, Mr. Jones regularly used other devices and
methods to achieve his ends:
-
- Requiring
People's Temple members to contribute as much as 25 percent of their
income and sign over to the People's Temple their properties and
other assets;
-
- At times
dictating marriage between unwilling partners and at other times not
allowing cohabitation between married couples;
- Undermining and breaking a child's ties with parents. In
progressive degrees the child was led to mistrust the parents and
become more and more secretive in his actions and evasive to his
parent's questions;
-
- As a
symbol of their trust in him, followers were required to sign
statements admitting homosexuality, theft, and other
self-incriminating acts; often as not People's Temple members would
also sign blank pages which could be filled in later. Depending on
Jones' need or objective, such documents were frequently used in
attempts to defame defectors;
-
- Rumor
spreading in an attempt to ruin reputations or generally implant
disinformation, thereby making true facts difficult if not
impossible to establish;
-
- Infiltration of groups opposed to People's Temple and
surveilance of suspected People's Temple enemies;
- Intense
public relations efforts ranging from letter-writing campaigns to
attempted control of news media in an effort to influence public
opinion with a favorable image of People's Temple; like-wise, an
aggressive program of seeking out political leaders and other
influential members of a community in order to cull their favor and
establish identification with them.
-
- In the
process of manipulating the control board of this extraordinary system
Jones suffered extreme paranoia. One can speculate that while it may
have been initially staged, his paranoia ultimately became a
self-created Frankenstein that led not only to his fall but the tragic
death of more than 900 others, including Representative Leo J. Ryan.
His paranoia ranged from "dark unnamed forces," to individuals such as
Tim Stoen and other defectors from the People's Temple, to
organizations such as the Concerned Relatives group, and ultimately to
the U.S. Government in the form of the CIA and the FBI--all of which
he ultimately believed were out to destroy him.
-
- Further, in
establishing this analysis of Jim Jones it is worth noting that he
apparently had several bisexual perversions. Finally, there is some
irony in the fact that although he controlled considerable wealth
(estimated at $12 million) he sought out special privileges but none
of the usual trappings of wealth such as fancy cars or expensive
houses. In short, Mr. Jones was more interested in ideas than in
things. He was not driven by greed for money but for power and control
over others. That control continues to be exerted even after his death
on the minds of some of his followers. It is graphically illustrated
by the suicide of Michael Prokes, one of Jones' closest associates,
during a March 13, 1979, press conference in California in which he
defended Jones and cited the achievements of People's Temple and
Jonestown.
-
- Motivation
of People's Temple Members
-
- The tactics
and techniques of Jim Jones outlined above found fertile ground and
were greatly facilitated because of the background and motivation of
those who joined People's Temple. Generalities, of course, are always
difficult if not dangerous. However, on this basis of the information
which has come to us in the course of this investigation one can draw
the following general profile of many who became People's Temple
members and followers of Jim Jones:
-
- Some of the
young adults were college graduates out of upper middle-class
backgrounds which provided privilege and even luxury. Their parents
were often college-educated professionals or executives. Frequently,
their families were active in demonstrations against the Vietnam
war, campaigns for racial equality, and other social cuases. In some
cases, the young People's Temple member had been alienated by the
"emptiness" of his family's wealth.
-
- A larger
number, especially young blacks, had their roots in the other end of
the American social and economic spectrum. The products of poor
ghetto neighborhoods and limited education, some had been drug
addicts, prostitutes, and street hustlers.
- An even
greater percentage were elderly, again perdominately black, who had
come out of the San Francisco ghetto. They found in Jim Jones an
abiding and protective concern. Despite the harshness of life in
Jonestown, they regarded it as preferable to the poor housing they
had left behind. They also found a warm sense of family and
acceptance within the People's Temple community that they did not
have before joining.
-
- A goodly
number of middle-class blacks and whites came out of strong
fundamentalist religious family backgrounds and were attracted by
what they saw as the evangelical nature of People's Temple.
-
- By
contrast, many of the younger people had little if any religious
motivation in joining People's Temple. Rather, they tended to be
compelled by humanitarian interests. Altruistic and idealistic, they
were impressed by Jones' involvement in social causes and what they
saw as the "political sophistication" of People's Temple. To the
extent that a religious motivation was involved, it was seen chiefly
in terms of Jones' seeming concrete application of Judeo-Christian
principles. Over time, the dimension of their motivation was not
only nonsectarian but eventually became embodied in the
Socialist-Marxist-agnostic philosophy which Jones espoused.
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- People's
Temple as a "Church"
-
- Out of the
findings outlined above regarding Jim Jones and members of his
People's Temple, emerges one additional finding. It relates to the
question of whether or not People's Temple was a "church" in the
generally accepted sense of that word. Again, on the basis of
testimony and compelling evidence collected in the course of this
investigation we offer the following conclusion on that
question:
-
- Although
People's Temple may have been a bona fide church in its Indiana and
early California origins, it progressively lost that
characterization in almost every respect. Rather, by 1972 and
following in progressive degrees, it evolved into what could be
described as a sociopolitical movement. Under the direction and
inspiration of it founder and director and the
Marxist-Leninist-Communist philosophy he embraced, People's Temple
was in the end a Socialist structure devoted to socialism. Despite
that fact, People's Temple continued to enjoy the tax-exempt status
it received in 1962 under Internal Revenue Service rules and
regulations. The issue of People's Temple's status as a "church" is
also significant in connection with First Amendment protections it
sought and received. Obviously, the latter issue is a difficult and
complex matter beyond the purview of this committee and its
investigation.
-
- Also outside
the parameters of this committee's inquiry is whether in fact People's
Temple was a "cult." Once again, recognizing that the problem is
complex and laced with emotions and strong connotative overtones, the
committee's investigation went only to the extent of seeking the
opinions of respected legal scholars.
-
- B.
Conspiracy Against Jim Jones and People's
Temple?
-
- Was there a
conspiracy against Jim Jones perpetrated by the U.S. Government or
some other organization? That was one of the questions on which the
Staff Investigative Group attempted to obtain evidence during the
course of this inquiry. On the basis of the information received, the
following findings are offered:
-
- Jones' idea
that there were elements opposed to his views and objectives dates
back to his early days in Indiana. In fact, it was the adverse
reaction he encountered relative to his racial integration and other
policies that led him to establish his own church, the People's
Temple
-
- When the
People's Temple relocated in Ukiah, Calif. in 1965 Jones' complaints
of opposition increased. They ranged in progressive degree from
alleged vandalism against People's Temple property, poisoning of his
pets, and various threats against Jones, to a shooting attack on
Jones' life (from which he "miraculously" recovered by his own
power). No substantiation was ever found on any of these complaints
reported to and investigated by Ukiah police.
-
- The mood
of Jones' allegations of anti-People's Temple conspiracy grew darker
when the group moved to San Francisco in 1972. At that time its
chief target was the media as well as unspecified "forces." Reported
attempts to dissuade Jones from the notion were apparently
unsuccessful.
-
- Jones'
idea of a U.S. Government plot against him, embodied mainly in the
CIA and FBI, took full bloom after he and the vast bulk of People's
Temple members moved to Guyana in 1977. Opposition of the Concerned
Relatives group was eventually attributed to CIA backing as were
periodic "alerts" he called to protect the People's Temple Jonestown
community from mercenaries in the jungle around Jonestown.
-
- Jones' two
lawyers offer contradictory opinions on the question of a possible
conspiracy against People's Temple and Jones. For example, Mark Lane
told the committee's investigators: "***there is no doubt in my mind
that various people sought to destroy Jonestown and that people in
various government agencies manipulated Jones. Jones, himself, saw
the efforts to manipulate him into an overreaction but somehow he
was unable to control his own responses ***. I believe that a
responsible investigation by the Congress would seek to determine
why various elements within the United States Government including
those in the State Department withheld from Congressman Ryhan and
the rest of us who accompanied him to Jonestown the fact that they
knew the place was an armed camp and that Jones was capable of
killing the Congressman and many others." On the other hand, Charles
Garry said: "***I want to unequivocally tell you in the year and a
half since July 1977, with the years of experience I have had with
governmental conspiracy and government wrongdoing, particularly the
FBI, I found no evidence to support any of the charges that were
made by People's Temple. I found no evidence to support any of
that."
-
- Granting
the strong likelihood of Jones' paranoia, compounded by his
manipulative abilities, Jones staged and exploited the idea of a
conspiracy as a means of generating fear in his adherents and
thereby gaining further control over them. The tactic also served to
keep any opponents on the defensive and even had the apparent effect
of sensitizing the U.S. Embassy in Guyana.
-
- No
conclusive evidence is available to indicate that the CIA was
acquiring information on Mr. Jones or People's Temple. In this same
connection it should be noted that under Executive Orders 11905 of
February 18, 1976 and 12036 of January 24, 1978, which prohibit
intelligence gathering on U.S. citizens, the CIA was legally
proscribed from engaging in any activities vis-a-vis People's
Temple.
- The
Department of Justice, on the other hand, has indicated to the Staff
Investigative Group that the FBI did look into an allegation from a
constituent of Senator S.I. Hayakawa that "Jim Jones was coaxing
individuals into traveling to Georgetown, Guyana, where they were
being held against their will for unknown reasons." The FBI
interviewed the constituent, but found that "relatives of the
constituent had traveled to Guyana voluntarily, and no evidence of
forced confinement was developed." The investigation was thereupon
terminated "because no violation of the Federal kidnaping statute
had occurred."
-
- The Staff
Investigative Group was also informed by the Criminal Division of the
Justice Department that it received a "citizen complaint" in December
1977, claiming "that a relative was being held in bondage in
Georgetown, Guyana by Pastor Jim Jones." The facts spelled out in the
complaint indicated no criminal violations within the Justice
Department's jurisdiction. Accordingly Justice's information on the
complaint was sent to the State
Department.
-
- C. Opponents
and Media Intimidated; Public Officials
Used
-
- As part of
Jones' constant and pervasive effort to control people and events, the
evidence obtained by the Staff Investigative Group established that he
persistently intimidated and harassed those who left People's Temple
and anyone else, especially the media, who he felt were opposed to his
interests. This clear pattern of intimidation and harassment was
reinforced and compounded into success by the widely held belief by
People's Temple defectors and opponents, that government officials
were friendly toward People's Temple or had in some way been
compromised. Consequently, attempts at early efforts to alert the
public to the nature of People's Temple's activities were largely
ignored and/or rejected.
-
- Typical of
some of Jones' tactics to intimidate and harass People's Temple
defectors who were actively opposed to him were the
following:
-
- Undermining
of their credibility as witnesses by spreading falsehoods and
releasing the so-called "confession" they had signed while members
of People's Temple;
-
- Fear
campaigns generated through break-ins, late night phone calls, and
unsigned letters threatening beatings and even death. One such
break-in carried out against a couple who had left People's Temple
was done with the help of their daughter who remained in the
organization.
-
- As a result
of such tactics People's Temple defectors were frequently frozen in
fear and severely hampered in their efforts to counteract Jones. The
problem is illustrated in the following example which points up the
desperate lengths to which opponents of People's Temple were driven as
well as the degree to which officials in San Francisco appear to have
been involved. Afraid to contact any public officials for fear that
they were tied-in or friendly to Jones, one individual went to the
length of writing consumer advocate Ralph Nader because he could not
think of anyone else he could trust. The letter to Nader outlined many
of the allegations against People's Temple which were later proven
true. It also indicated that the letter writer feared for his life. it
closed as follows:
-
- If you want
to help us, please write in the personal column of the Chronicle to
"Angelo" and sign it Ralph and then we will respond and talk to
you.
-
- Rather than
do that, Nader sent the letter to the District Attorney's Office in
San Francisco. By some means, the letter filtered back to People's
Temple and the writer soon thereafter received a threatening phone
call that said "We know all about your letter to
Angelo."
-
- In another
instance People's Temple defectors hired a private detective to
surreptitiously observe their meeting with Jones' representatives in a
public subway station. Their objective was to have an eyewitness in
the event of violence.
- With respect
to Jim Jones' and People's Temple efforts to stifle the San Francisco
media some of the following methods were
employed:
-
- The threat
of law suits. In almost all instances in which this tactic was used
it was based on the People's Temple possession of copies of stories
in draft form prior to publication obtained through break-ins or
provided to People's Temple by infiltrators within the media's
office.
-
- Threatening phone calls to reporters and their families,
accepted by one as serious enough to warrant relocating children,
moving into hotels, and obtaining guns for self-protection.
-
- Extensive
letter-writing campaigns intended to dissuade publishers and editors
from printing stories being prepared by aggressive reporters. The
soft-sell nature of this tactic was aimed at creating diversionary
arguments contending that the story in question would reflect badly
on San Francisco or prevent People's Temple "from continuing its
good work with the 'disaffected and disaffiliated' in society." One
such campaign produced letters supportive of People's Temple from
San Francisco Mayor George Moscone, Lieutenant Governor Mervyn
Dymally, the head of the San Francisco school system, and members of
the California State Assembly. It would appear that such campaigns
were particularly effective with the San Francisco Chronicle and the
National Enquirer.
- Encouraging San Francisco merchants and businesses to remove
their advertising from "offending" publications. The chief target of
such an effort was the New West magazine immediately prior to its
publication in August 1977, of an article critical of Jones. The
editor of the magazine persisted and the article is generally
credited with breaking Jones' stronghold on San Francisco and led
him to go to Guyana immediately before it appeared.
-
- The
picketing of newspaper offices which had run stories on Jones
regarded as anti-People's Temple. One such effort, combined with the
threat of a law suit, led to the cancellation in 1972 by the San
Francisco Examiner of an eight-part series of articles, only half of
which had already appeared. The end result was to make most editors
and publishers highly sensitive and cautious regarding any critical
stories involving Jones and the People's Temple.
-
- Finally, as
to the question of whether or not certain officials had in fact been
compromised by Jones, the Staff Investigative Group believes the
evidence is mixed. What is indisputably clear and solidly based on
evidence is that many such officials were perceived of by Jones'
opponents as extremely friendly to or enthusiastically supportive of
Jones, thereby precluding them or their offices from pursuing actions
against Jones in an impartial manner. In this regard, it should be
kept in mind that Jones had endowed himself with the cloak of official
legitimacy through his appointment by Mayor Moscone as director of the
San Francisco Housing Authority. In addition political figures in San
Francisco appear to have been enticed by Jones' ability to turn out
hundreds of his followers to attend rallys, conduct mailings, man
phone-banks, and otherwise provide support to political election
campaigns, including some direct contributions.
-
- Similarly,
the media were not immune from Jones' wiles and attemped flatteries.
For example, Jones made contributions of various sums totaling $4,400
to the San Francisco Examiner, the San Francisco Chronicle, and 10
other newspapers to be used as they saw fit in the "defense of a free
press," Although the Examiner returned the money to the People's
Temple, the management of the Chronicle sent the check to Sigma Delta
Chi, the national journalism society, which in turn rejected
suggestions that it be returned to People's
Temple.
-
- D. Awareness
of Danger; Predicting the Degree of
Violence
-
- One area on
which this inquiry concentrated under Chairman Zablocki's mandate
dealt with the questions of whether (a) Representative Ryan had been
adequately advised of the potential for danger, and (b) how accurately
anyone could have predicted the degree of violence employed. On the
basis of evidence gathered we have reached conclusions on both
counts:
-
- Representative Ryan was advised on more than one occasion of
the possibility of violence inherent in his trip to Jonestown.
However, he tended to discount such warnings with the thought that
his office as a Congressman would protect him. Moreover, he was
apparently willing to face whatever danger might be present, citing
as a reason his own previous investigative experiences and his
determination not to be influenced by fear.
-
- The
warnings Mr. Ryan did receive regarding the prospect for violence
came chiefly from his own staff and the Concerned Relatives group.
When the issue was raised in the State Department briefings prior to
the trip, Mr. Ryan did not challenge State's assessment that
potential danger was "unlikely." In fact, State's briefings for the
Ryan Codel dwelled almost exclusively on the legal problems relative
to the trip as well as the logistical difficulties involved in
reaching the remote and isolated jungle compound.
-
- No one
interviewed by the Staff Investigative Group ever anticipated the
degree of violence acutally encountered. Many expected that there
might be adversarial encounters, arguments, or shouting; the worst
anticipated was that someone might "get punched in the mouth."
-
- From a
variety of sources, Representative Ryan and some representatives of
the media were cautioned that they were regarded as adversaries of
People's Temple and Jones. They were further informed that Jones was
paranoid. It is appropriate to note here that Mr. Ryan apparently
did not advise anyone in the State Department or the U.S. Embassy in
Guyana that one of the purposes of his trip was to help possible
defectors leave Jonestown with him on November 18.
-
- Some
members of Mr. Ryan's staff as well as the media group had gut
feelings on the possibility for violence. They ranged from advising
Mr. Ryan that Jones had a "capacity" for violence, to a general
concern based on allegations of guns in Jonestown, and finally, to
the thought that a bomb might be placed on the plane on which the
entire party flew to Guyana. At the most extreme end of such
intuitive hunches and feelings was Miss Jackie Speier's premotion of
fear that led her to write her own will.
-
- To the
extent that violence was considered a possibility by the Ryan Codel,
there is evidence to suggest that Mr. Ryan may have looked on the
accompanying media group as a "shield"; conversely, to the extent
there was any apprehension in their ranks, the media regarded Mr.
Ryan's status as a Congressman as their best protection. For other
members of the media, the principal potential danger considered was
the jungle against which they protected themselves by taking special
supplies.
-
- E. U.S.
Customs Service Investigation
-
- One key
element relating to the question of whether the Ryan Codel had
adequate awareness of the potential for danger as well as the degree
of violence which ultimately ensued involves a 1977 U.S. Customs
Service investigation of reported illegal gun shipments and other
contraband to Jonestown. In the course of this inquiry, therefore, the
Staff Investigative Group obtained evidence which warrants the
following findings on the subject:
-
- Working on
allegations interspersed amid many "bizarre" tales about People's
Temple, the investigation was begun in February 1977. One of the
allegations contended that more than 170 weapons once stored in
Ukiah had been transferred to People's Temple San Francisco
headquarters and then possibly on to Jonestown.
-
- The
investigation was compromised 1 month after it began, not through
any inadvertence on the part of the Customs Service, but when an
individual conveyed some information on the matter to Dennis Banks,
head of the American Indian Movement, in an effort to dissuade Banks
from any further contact with Jones. That conversation was
apparently taped and word was passed to Jones. Complete details of
the investigation's report were further compromised when a copy of
the report was sent to Interpol. From Interpol it was by normal
procedure, shared with the Guyanese police. According to information
provided us, Guyanese Police Commissioner C. A. "Skip" Roberts
reportedly showed a copy to either Paula Adams or Carolyn Layton,
two of Mr. Jones' trusted aides, one of whom passed the information
to Mr. Jones.
-
- Although
the Customs Service investigation was not diluted or diminished in
any way, it is clear that it was carried out in an unusually
sensitive mode because of what was perceived to be Jim Jones'
considerable political influence in San Francisco. Surveillance
relating to the investigation was virtually impossible to carry out
because of the tight security screen Jones placed around the Geary
Street headquarters of People's Temple in San Francisco.
-
- The
investigation was concluded in August-September 1977 after a
shipment of crates destined for Jonestown was opened and inspected
by the Customs Service in Miami in August 1977. Shortly thereafter a
report on the investigation was filed with negative results.
Nonetheless, investigators apparently felt enough residual suspicion
to send copies of the report to Interpol and the U.S. Department of
State "because (the) investigation disclosed allegations that Jones
intends to establish a political power base in Guyana, and that he
may currently have several hundred firearms in that country***."
-
- The copy
of the Customs Service report was received in the State Department's
Office of Munitions Control on September 1, 1997 and on September 6,
1977 a copy was forwarded to the Department's Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs. although standard routing procedures
provided that a copy should have been sent to the U.S. Embassy in
Guyana there is no indication a copy ever was sent. In addition,
only the Guyana desk officer saw the report: none of the more than
26 State Department officials we interviewed saw the report until
after November 18, 1978, although one professed "awareness" of it
earlier.
-
- F.
Conspiracy To Kill Representative Ryan?
-
- Relative to
the likelihood of a People's Temple-Jim Jones conspiracy to kill
Representative Ryan, the Staff Investigative Group has reached the
following conclusions based on evidence available to
us:
-
- The
possibility of any prior conspiracy tends to be diminished by the
fact that Gordon Lindsay, a reporter whom Mr. Jones regarded as an
arch enemy of People's Temple, was not allowed to enter Jonestown
with the Ryan party.
-
- Still not
to be discounted entirely, however, is the possible existence of a
contingency conspiracy. In this connection, there are reports of an
"understanding' in Jonestown that if efforts to delude Ryan as to
the true conditions at Jonestown failed he would have to be killed,
supposedly by arranging for his plane to crash in the jungle after
leaving Jonestown. While circumstantial evidence is available on
this theory we have not found any hard evidence.
-
- Providing
some moderate credence to the idea of a contingency conspiracy is
the fact that the Jonestown mass suicide/murder ritual started
before the Port Kaituma assailants returned to confirm the shootings
of Representative Ryan and others.
- Also
lending some substance to the contingency conspiracy theory are
unconfirmed reports that a large shipment of cyanide, used in the
mass suicide/murder, arrived in Jonestown 2 days before Ryan's
visit. Also related is the reported statement of a Jonestown
survivor that several days before Mr. Ryan arrived in Jonestown he
heard Jones say that the Congressman's plane "might fall from the
sky."
-
- In an
effort to obtain detailed information on Mr. Ryan's upcoming trip,
Jones placed a phony defector within the ranks of the Concerned
Relatives group in San Francisco 1 month before the Codel's
departure for Guyana. The "defector" was seen back in Jonestown when
the Ryan party arrived. The late awareness that the defector was
false produced a heightened sense of danger in the minds of some
making the trip.
-
- G. The
Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information
Act
-
- Throughout
this investigation there were repeated references made as to the
pervasive role of the Privacy Act and, to a lesser degree, the Fredom
of Information Act in the tragedy at Jonestown. The Staff
Investigative Group made a careful and thorough review of the issue
which resulted in the following findings:
-
- The Privacy
Act figured prominently in several important aspects of the State
Department's and U.S. Embassy's briefings and relations with the
Ryan Codel and their handling of all matters relating to People's
Temple.
-
- Officials
within both the State Department and the Embassy clearly tended to
confuse the Privacy Act with the Freedom of Information Act, thereby
inhibiting the comprehensiveness of written reports and exchanges of
information.1 One key Embassy official, for instance, was
operating under the mistaken assumption that People's Temple was
seeking cables reporting on consular visits to Jonestown under
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
-
- Representative Ryan's legal advisers contended that the State
Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act was unreasonably
narrow and restrictive and further felt that fact had ramifications
on what the Codel wished to accomplish. Those differences, which
began in Washington and continued in Guyana, resulted in somewhat
strained relations between the State Department and the Codel.
- The State
Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act led them to deny Ryan
access to certain information and documents relative to People's
Temple. That problem could have been avoided or at least alleviated
if Mr. Ryan had followed the Department's advice to obtain a letter
from the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs authorizing
him such access under an exemption clause in the act. That exemption
provision permits disclousure to any committee of Congress "to the
extent of matter within its jurisdiction." Reflecting the State
Department's lack of knowledge of the law and its application, it is
pertinent to note that on February 28, 1979, the State Department
was unaware of the exemption provision in denying to Chairman
Zablocki requested information germane to the investigation.
-
- Prior to
the Codel's departure, the U.S. Embassy in Guyana reflected its own
acute sensitivity regarding the Privacy Act by urging that Mr. Ryan
be fully informed of the act's limitations. That sensitivity was
reinforced by the Embassy's request that a Department legal expert
accompany the Codel, a request denied by State because of travel
freeze restrictions and the heavy press of other work.
- Among the
Embassy officials interviewed there is almost unanimous agreement
that the Privacy Act is complex, difficult to understand, and
confusing. Accordingly, they believe that regular guidance is
required to guarantee proper implementation.
- Initial
State Department guidance on the Privacy Act provided to the U.S.
Embassy in Guyana was so highly techhnical and legalistic that it
had little if any practical value, a problem compounded by
subsequent communications. It was not until November 18, 1977,
almost 3 years after the Privacy Act became law, that the Embassy
was provided with what could be regarded as practical guidance.
However, even that communication contained the following prefatory
comment: "Due to its rapid passage by Congress in December 1974
without hearings, less than the usual legislative history exists to
guide executive departments in interpreting history exists to guide
executive departments in interpreting it.***." Available at that
time was a 1,500-page volume, "Legislative History of the Privcacy
Act of 1974," which incorporated committee reports, markup sessions,
excerpts from floor debate and other pertinent source materials.
-
- In
day-to-day operations and application, the Privacy Act impacts more
on the State Department's consular section than on its diplomatic
officers.
-
- Given the
confusion surrounding the Privacy Act and the lack of practical and
understandable guidance, it appears that Embassy consular officers
in Guyana found the act difficult to implement properly. In
contrast, most of their Washington counterparts, in both political
and consular sections of the Department, did not perceive the
Embassy's problems and felt the guidance provided was adequate.
-
- Also
contributing to those official's ability to effectively implement
the Privacy Act vis-a-vis the People's Temple was the understanding
they held that as a religious organization People's Temple merited
added protection under the act. Disregarding for now the question of
whether or not People's Temple was a religion, few of the officials
knew that the act's prohibition on maintaining records describing
the exercise of the first amendment rights also provides and
exception for matters pertinent to law enforcement activities.
Further, there appeared to be little general awareness among State
Department Personnel of other exemptions provided in both the
Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act from mandatory agency
disclosure of information.
-
- The legal
recourse Jones and People's Temple had under the Privacy Act and
Freedom of Information Act to obtain Embassy cables had the chilling
effect on Embassy personnel of making their communications to the
State Department on People's Temple less candid than they might have
otherwise been. That effect was reinforced when the Embassy learned
on December 2, 1977, that People's Temple had in fact filed a total
of 26 actions under the Privacy Act, for documents relating to
specified People's Temple members. As a byproduct of these
restraints it is reasonable to conclude that the Embassy's
inhibitions to more candidly and accurately report their impressions
of the true situation in Jonestown ultimately influenced the State
Department's ability to more effectively brief the Ryan Codel. Also
not to be discounted is the strong possibility that, knowing the law
and the effect it could produce, Jones used the legal claim actions
as a tactic in order to achieve the very effect it did.
-
- Overall,
many State Department officials appeared to be highly aware of the
civil and/or criminal penalty provisions of both acts. That fact
reinforced their perceived image of both acts as threatening and
troublesome in that failure to comply could present them with
serious personal legal problems. In turn, that thought made them
doubly cautious in their dealings with People's Temple.
-
- H. Role and
Performance of the U.S. Department of
State
-
- The role and
performance of the State Department in this matter was the central
issue earmarked for investigation in Chairman Zablocki's mandate to
the Staff Investigative Group. The points of reference surrounding
that issue span 4 years and are complex and many. Given this reality,
a major part of the investigation was devoted to this aspect of the
issue. The following conclusions and findings based on evidence
gathered are:
-
- The U.S.
Embassy in Guyana did not demonstrate adequate initiative, sensitive
reaction to, and apprecitation of progressively mounting indications
of highly irregular and illegal activities in Jonestown. The
Embassy's one attempt to confront the situation and affect a
solution did not occur until June 1978. Essentially embodying what
could at best be described as the Embassy's heightened suspicion of
problems with People's Temple, the effort was made in the form of a
cable to the State Department requesting permission to approach the
Guyanese Government and "request that the government exercise normal
adminintrative jurisdiction over the community, particularly to
insure that all of its residents are informed and understand that
they are subject to the laws and authority of the Government of
Guyana***." The State Department, failing to detect any linkage
between Log 126 and the then recent defection of Temple member
Debbie Blakey and other incidents, rejected the request in a terse
cable because such an overture "could be construed by some as U.S.
Government interference." (Debbie Blakey defected from the People's
Temple in Georgetown, Guyana on May 12, 1978, with the assistance of
U.S. Embassy officers Richard McCoy and Daniel Weber. Prior to her
departure to the United States, she submitted a written statement to
the Embassy warning, among other things, of the possibility of a
mass suicide in Jonestown.)
-
- The
Department's negative response to Log 126 had the net effect of
reinforcing the Embassy's already cautious attitude in all dealings
with the People's Temple. Despite the fact that an affirmative
response was anticipated, the Embassy surprisingly made no effort to
challenge the Department's negative decision. Equally surprising was
the Department's failure to contact the Ambassador and determine
what specifically triggered his request. Testimony from Department
witnesses indicates that the lack of specificity in Log 126 was the
primary reason for the negative response in Log 130. Such
specificity (e.g., Blakey defection) was deliberately avoided,
according to the Ambassador, because of Privacy Act considerations.
The upshot of this exchange was a lamentable breakdown in
communication with neither side making any further efforts to
discuss or follow up on the matter.
-
- Mitigating
factors were present wihich require acknowledgment. For example, it
is understandable that the Embassy did not have an investigative or
judicial function. It also felt compelled to abide by U.S. laws as
well as strict State Department rules and regulations while
simultaneously respecting the hospitality of Guyana. Embassy
personnel were also faced with the challenge of trying to remain
objective in the face of two opposing groups of Americans often
presenting contradictory stories; a factor reinforced by numerous
letters, articles, and documents reflecting equally pro and con
dimensions on Jones and the People's Temple. Out of that balance the
Embassy concluded only that People's Temple prior to November 18,
1978, was a "controversial" or "unusual" group.
-
- Nevertheless, absent in the Embassy's dealings with People's
Temple were the vital elements of common sense and an honest and
healthy skepticism. Despite the acknowledged handicaps under which
it worked the Embassy could have exerted sounder overall judgment
and a more aggressive posture. One important result of such an
effort would have been more accurate and straightforward reporting
on the People's Temlple situation which, in turn, could have given
the State Department a stronger and wider base on which to draw in
biefing Representative Ryan and his staff. In this connection, the
Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act, each of which was
discussed in a previous section, played important roles.
-
- It is
proven beyond doubt that Jones staged a show for selective visitors
to Jonestown which made it difficult to get a realistic and accurate
picture of what was actually happening there. The ability of the
Embassy to break through this facade was severely hampered by
several factors. First, the "Embassy provided in advance to People's
Temple, the names of most but not all of the individuals who were to
be interviewed by visiting consular officers. That practice allowed
Jones to rehearse those people on what to say and how to act.
Second, such "staging" practices were greatly facilitated by the
limited time spent in Jonestown by visiting U.S. Embassy
officials-an average of 5-8 hours on four different occasions
between August 30, 1977, and November 7, 1978.
- In
conducting normal consular activities in Jonestown and in other
interactions with People's Temple, Embassy officials were restricted
by constitutionally mandated safeguards prohibiting interference
with free exercise of religious beliefs and with legally sanctioned
religious organizations. Recognizing that this issue is not within
the direct purview of the committee's investigation, we nevertheless
note (as observed earlier) that many People's Temple members were
originally motivated less by religious considerations than by a
general social idealism. In addition, it is clear that People's
Temple had little specific dimension or few surface trappings which
would have made it a "church."
-
- There was
a laxness in State Department procedures for distributing certain
important documents relative to People's Temple, thereby inhibiting
the opportunity for taking appropriate action. Chief among these was
the U.S. Customs Service report on possible gun shipments to
Jonestown. Others include the April 10, 1978, affidavit by Yolanda
D.A. Crawford, a People's Temple defector, describing beatings and
abuses in Jonestown; the affidavit signed in May 1978 by Debbie
Blakey, another People's Temple defector, describing suicide
rehearsals and other serious charges; and finally the New West
magazine article of August 1, 1977, which exposed Jones. A wider
awareness of these and similar materials would have significantly
enhanced the State Department's ability to evaluate the situation.
As a reflection of the problem it is interesting to note that a
number of State Department officials interviewed readily volunteered
the observation that prior to his trip to Guyana "Mr. Ryan knew more
about People's Temple and Jonestown than we did."
- State
Department organization and day-to-day operations created a
distinction between its consular activities and its diplomatic
responsibilities. Inadequate coordination between those two
functions led to a situation in which matters involving People's
Temple were regarded almost exclusively as consular. Despite
mounting indications that the People's Temple issue was spilling
over into the United States-Guyana diplomatic area, the mentality
persisted of relegating it to the consular side.
-
- In the
area of crisis management following the tragedy of November 18 the
State Department and Embassy performed with distinction.
Particularly praiseworthy in this regard were the brave and
dedicated efforts of Richard Dwyer in aiding and providing
leadership under trying circumstances to survivors of the Port
Kaituma shooting. Equally admirable were the Department's and
Embassy's efforts in evacuating the wounded, providing assistance to
others, and keeping Washington officials adequately informed of
developments. Also commendable was the competent and efficient work
of Department of Defense personnel in assisting the wounded and
others and returning them to the United States.
-
- As to
allegations that a female member of People't Temple in Guyana had
engaged in a sexual liaison with former U.S. Consul Richard McCoy
and had made tape recordings of their sexual activities in an
attempt to compromise McCoy, it is our firm judgment, based on our
findings, that such allegations are false.The woman in question has
in fact testified and signed an affidavit categorically denying all
such charges. She further stated that, "To the best of my knowledge,
no member of People's Temple engaged in any sexual activity with
Richard A. McCoy" and that the People's Temple relationship with
McCoy was one of "mistrust and strained discussion though not openly
hostile." Nor is there any evidence to indicate that any other
person affiliated with the U.S. Embassy in Guyana had at any time
been compromised by the People's Temple.
-
- I.
Involvement of the Government of Guyana
-
- On the issue
of People's Temple involvement with the Government of Guyana, the
Staff Investigative Group renders the following incomplete findings:
-
- There is
evidence of a strong working relationship between the People's
Temple and some officials of the Government of Guyana, especially in
the areas of customs and immigration. It is obvious that a special
privileged status allowed People's Temple to bring that special
privileged status allowed People's Temple to bring items into Guyana
outside of the usual customs procedures, often with cursory
inspection at best. Many shipments were inspected perfunctorily or
not at all. It is likely that People's Temple brought large sums of
money and guns into Guyana in suitcases and false-bottom creates as
a result of such customs inspections. As a matter of fact, some of
these concerns were expressed by Guyanese officials.
-
- Guyanese
immigration procedures were also compromised to the advantage of
People's Temple on several occasions, chiefly in two key areas.
First, People's Temple members were able to facilitate entry of
their own members or inhibit the exit of defectors by having access
to customs areas at Timehri Airport in Georgetown closed to all
other citizens. Second, clearly arbitrary decisions were made to
curtail the visas and expedite the exit of individuals regarded as
opponents of People's Temple. Only upon the strenuous efforts of the
U.S. Embassy were some of these decisions ultimately reversed and
then at the last minute.
-
- There are
in the investigative record repeated charges of a sexual liaison
between People's Temple member Paula Adams and Laurence Mann,
Guyana's Ambassador to the United States. It has encounters with
Mann. Transcripts of some of those tapes were apparently made for
Mr. Jones and periodically turned over to high officials in the
Guyanese Government.
- There is
also evidence, incomplete and inconclusive, that unknown officials
of the Guyanese Government may have taken action to influence the
outcome of the Stoen custody case proceedings in the Guyanese court
system.
-
- Testimony
from some witnesses suggest that support extended to the People's
Temple by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Development Ptolemy
Reid was born of an ideological compatibility with an endorsement of
the Temple's Socialist philosophy. While such support was exploited
in the sense that it had the ultimate effect of furthering People's
Temple objectives, it did not appear to be generated for illegal
reasons.
-
- Note-In
reference to these findings regarding the relationship of the
Government of Guyana to the People's Temple, the Staff Investigative
Group was precluded from confirming or dispelling various
allegations by the refusal of the Guyanese Government to meet and
talk with the Group, per Chairman Zablocki's requests of March 2 and
16, 1979. Consequently, to our regret, some of the findings noted
above must remain partial and incomplete. There is no doubt in our
mind, however, that our inability to interview Guyanese Government
officials leaves this report with a conspicuous void.
-
- J. Social
Security; Foster Children
-
- Although this
inquiry's scope did not require investigating allegations that the
People's Temple stole or fraudulently used its members social security
benefits, some information regarding these charges did surface during
the course of the probe that is worth noting.
-
- At the time
of the tragedy of November 18, 1978, a total of 199 social security
annuitants reportedly lived in Jonestown. Altogether their annuities
amounted to approximately $37,000 per month. It is readily apparent
that this income contributed substantially to the maintenance of the
Jonestown operations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is
presently conducting a review of its responsibilities and performances
in paying benefits to Temple members. In this regard, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare has submitted an interim report to the
committee. In essence, the report indicates that to date no wrongdoing
on the part of the temple has been discovered. It does cite, however,
four cases that are being investigated because the beneficiaries'
checks were being forwarded to Guyana from the United States without
Social Security Administration's records revealing their correct
addresses. The Social Security Administration review is continuing and
upon its completion the committee is to receive a copy of the final
report.
- The interim
report indicates, inter alia, that the Social Security Administration
is responsible for administering Section 207 of the Social Security
Act (43 U.S.C. 407) which provides, "the right of any person to any
future payment under this title shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity***." Consequently, whenever a social
security annuitant requests that his or her checks be mailed to
someone else's address the Social Security Administration looks into
the possibility of assignment. Such an inquiry was launched after
Temple members moved to Guyana and asked that their monthly payments
be mailed in care of the Jonestown settlement's post office box
address.
-
- The
U.S.Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana was asked by the Social Security
Administration to query Jonestown residents as to why they wanted
their checks sent to the settlement's post office address and whether
any of the beneficaries had assigned the right to future payments to
the People's Temple.
-
- In response
to the Social Security Administration's request, U.S. Consul Richard
McCoy, during January and May 1978 visits to Jonestown, determined
that the post office box address was being used for the convenience of
the beneficiaries, that each annuitant interviewed was receiving and
controlling the use of his monthly payment, and that none had assigned
their checks to the Temple. McCoy's successor, Douglas Ellice,
accompanied by Vice Consul Dennis Reece, also checked into social
security matters during a November 7, 1978, visit to
Jonestown.
-
- McCoy did
find Jonestown social security beneficiaries who were heavily
influenced to turn over their monthly benefits to the Temple.
Nevertheless, in his estimation, these individuals volutarily gave
their money to the Temple. In addition, he reported that all of the
beneficiaries he saw in Jonestown appeared to be adequately housed,
fed, and in relatively good health. Given these findings, the Social
Security Administration decided to continue the procedure of mailing
the monthly checks to the Jonestown post office box
address.
-
- Section 1611
(f) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1811 (f)) stipulates
that:
- ***no
individual shall be considered an eligible individual for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, for any month during
all of which such individual is outside the United
States***
- According to
the Social Security Administration interim report:
-
- ***as soon
as it was learned that members of the People's Temple were moving to
Guyana, the Social Security Administration district office in San
Francisco, working with postal officials and officials of the
People's Temple, went to extraordinary lengths to ensure Social
Security Administration was notified when a member who was entitled
to social security benefits moved abroad. This action proved very
effective. When members who had been entitled to SSI benefits left
the United States, action was taken to stop the SSI
payments.
-
- To date, the
Social Security Administration has discovered only one instance of a
Temple beneficiary going to Guyana without notifying Social Security
Administration authorities. This individual's checks were received and
cashed by her husband who continued to live in the United States. The
Social Security Administration has found nothing to indicate that the
failure to report the wife's move to Guyana involved People's Temple
officials.
- The Staff
Investigative Group has been informed by the Social Security
Administration that its ongoing review of payments to Temple members
is focusing on the following:
-
- (a) Did any
of the Retirement Survivors Disability Insurance (RSDI)
beneficiaries living in Jonestown die there before November 18,
1978, without the knowledge of the Social Security
Administration?
- (b) Were
any SSI payments made to a beneficiary for months after the month
that individual left the United states? (As mentioned earlier, such
payments are illegal.)
-
- Some 656
social security checks were found uncashed and undeposited in
Jonestown after the November 18 tragedy. According to one State
Department official, the vast majority of the approximately $160,000
in checks recovered in Jonestown were August, September, and October
1978 social security checks.
-
- The Social
Security Administration claims it will be several months before the
process of identifying the remains of the Jonestown dead is finished.
At last report, 173 social security beneficiaries have been positively
identified as dead. Eight others are known to have survived. The
balance of 18 are still unaccounted for but the presumption is that
they are among the unidentified deceased.
-
- Possibly as
many as 150 foster children have been alleged to have died in
Jonestown during the mass suicide/murder ritual of last November.
Senator Alan Cranston's Subcommittee on Child and Human Development is
conducting an investigation of these charges with the assistance of
the GAO. Preliminary indications are that 12 California foster
children may be identified as having died. Greatly complicating the
identification process is the fact that neither dental nor fingerprint
records exist on most of the children. At this writing, it is hoped
that the GAO investigators may be able to provide at least a
preliminary report of their findings to Senator Cranston's
subcommittee by the end of May 1979 for a hearing that will be held in
Los Angeles.
-
- The Staff
Investigative Group was informed by State Department witnesses that
the U.S. Embassy in Guyana was never asked by California welfare
officials to check on the welfare and whereabouts of California foster
children reportedly living in Jonestown. The U.S. Embassy, however,
was aware that some foster children may have been living there and
asked the Department of State to determine whether it was legal for
such wards of the State to leave the United States. One Department
witness stated that he queried appropriate California authorities and
was told that court permission was required to take them out of the
State. This same official also discerned some reluctance on the part
of these authorities to talk about the
subject.
-
- K. Future
Status of People's Temple
-
- Although it
was beyond the purview of the inquiry as mandated by Chairman
Zablocki, the Staff Investigative Group obtained evidence and
impressions relative to the possible future status of People's Temple
and some related matters which the Group believes are useful to
establish for this record.
-
- Accordingly,
it is our judgment at this time that the possibility of People's
Temple being reconstituted cannot be discounted. This belief is based
in large measure on the distinction seemingly held by surviving
People's Temple members between Jim Jones as an individual and what
People's Temple represented as an organization.Thus, while some
remaining People's Temple members express varying degrees of regret,
dismay, and disapproval over what Jim Jones did, they still seem to
embrace the principles and objectives which they believer People's
Temple sought to achieve. There is also some evidence to suggest that
a power struggle may be underway within the ranks of surviving
People's Temple sought to achieve. There is also some evidence to
suggest that a power struggle may be underway within the ranks of
surviving People's Temple members in an attempt to establish a new
leader. Only time will determine whether in fact such a development
may take place.
-
- While the
existence of a reported "hit squad" whose purported purpose is to
eliminate Jones' staunchest opponents cannot be concretely documented
it should not totally discounted. this group has been described as
including some of Jones' most zealous adherents. There is evidence to
suggest Jones and some of his key lieutenants discussed and had
"understandings" to eliminate various individuals, including national
political leaders. Time may diminish the possible threat of this
factor in any and all future activities and investigations aimed at
People's Temple.
- 1. Much of
the confusion over these two acts results from the sometimes
conflicting principal purposes for which each was enacted. The Privacy
Act guarantees the privacy of public records maintained on an
individual and limits access, except for the concerned party, to these
records by other individuals and government agencies. The Freedom of
Information Act guarantees an individual access to records pertinent
to the operations of the Federal Government but safeguards the privacy
of individuals cited in those records.
-
|